You are quite right, I changed my mind and do no longer speak of “radical evil.” … It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never “radical,” that it is only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. It is “thought-defying,” as I said, because thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the roots, and the moment it concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is its “banality.” Only the good has depth that can be radical.
Thus, the trial of Arendt is clear: modernity is a corruption of political activity. Guarantor of freedom, it has become way of preservation of life, that is involved in a sphere other than his own, drawing its legitimacy elsewhere than itself. Condition of possibility of communication between citizens, the only way to build a common world, the technology-policy has, as evidenced, according to Arendt, the erection of the secret system of government, as a principle opacity, it was exploited for the benefit of biological necessity. Yet this loss of meaning, which is responsible for the technical nature of the policy was directly reflected in the space of appearance. The model of the ecclesia was cleared to make way for representative government, for which Arendt is suspicious. These are based, of course, a limitation of their power, but this limitation is not intended to allow the political activity of citizens, as governments do not guarantee that private freedom. Any idea of government means for her escape, an escape from the action. Therefore, parliamentary governments, and through them the whole political modernity, involved the destruction of the Greek model of the ecclesia. The secret, as a principle of opacity, ruined political activity in favor of the silent acquiescence of the masses. The silence of the power leads that of the public, condemned to passivity in the public domain and free private order. By the structural nature of the silence of political modernity, we must ask whether, hollow, does not hide the desire to subject the company to the regime of transparency, such as denaturing hypertrophy of advertising in the sense that nothing should can not be immediately visible? This transparency would do it no violence? Identification Arendt of silence and secrecy is not it excessive? Can we not imagine a gap between political action and publicizing, or better yet between reflection and action itself? The accusation against Arendt’s public sphere, that of being the place to practice the technical reason (in the service of sustaining life), does it do not fall into a category of critics whose denominator common final rejection of modernity, in which there is nothing to hope or to believe that negative?